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NATURAL LAW-
AN UNCHANGING
STANDARD?
R. D. LUMB*
A FEATURE ASSOCIATED with the traditional doctrine of natural law is
its unchanging form. In the nineteenth century this feature was
criticized by members of the historical and sociological schools who
denied the existence of absolute rules of human nature. This criticism
led certain legal philosophers to propound a theory of "natural law with
a variable content" - a theory which seemed to deprive the natural law
doctrine of its primary claim to validity.
It seems that it would be useful to examine the writings of-the leading
representatives of the traditional school of natural law - Aquinas and
Sufirez - in order to see to what extent they were aware of the problem
of "change." In other words our task will be to ascertain whether the
traditional doctrine takes account of the variables which are to be found
in any system of rules or institutions.
Aquinas' discussion of the feature of change is to be found in the
fourth and fifth articles of Question ninety four of the Summa Theologica.
In the fifth article he makes the statement that change can be under-
stood in two ways, as an addition and as a diminution. In the case of
addition, natural law can be changed because "many things for the
benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural law,
*LL.M., D. PHIL., Lecturer in Law, University of Queensland, Australia.
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both by divine law and by human law."
But as far as diminution is concerned:
the natural law is altogether unchange-
able in its first principles: but in its sec-
ondary principles which as we have said,
are certain detailed proximate conclusions
drawn from the first principles, natural law
is the standard of rectitude in most cases.
But it may be changed in some particular
cases of rare occurrence through some spe-
cial cases hindering the observance of such
precepts as stated above.'
The example which he gives of this type
of change is the oft-quoted one of the
deposit. In the majority of cases it is right
and proper to return what one has received
as a deposit, but in certain cases it may not
be right and proper, for example, if the
deposit would be used for some evil pur-
pose.
In the De Legibus, Suirez discusses the
twofold change and remarks that the change
which takes place when something is added
to the natural law by human law is not
"true" change, "since addition does not
constitute a change when the law is left
in its entirety," but rather, there takes
place "a perfecting or extension." 2 In this
he is nearer the point. As we shall see later,
the natural law cannot be regarded as com-
plete in the sense that its operation is com-
pletely specified. Indeed, on the one hand,
its precepts are in need of interpretation
and exposition and, on the other hand, its
precepts are not sufficient to deal with
every problem which may arise. Conse-
quently, it is inaccurate to speak of natural
law as being added to by positive law, for
1 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-I, q.94, art. 5.
2 See SUAREZ, DE LEGmus, bk. 2, ch. 13 passim
[hereinafter cited as DE LEmus].
no change takes place in the natural law
when a positive law is enacted. For the
natural law itself is not changed. The addi-
tion which the positive law makes is in
the realm of positive law and not of ethical
principles.
What concerns us in this section is the
question of interpretation. Indeed the whole
question of "diminution" of the natural law
must be studied in the light of this ques-
tion, for it seems that when the Schoolmen
use the phrase they are not thinking of the
precepts of the natural law as being abol-
ished but as being narrowed down by
interpretation to fulfill the needs of classes
of cases which do not seem to be rightly
subsumed under the general principles.
When Aquinas refers to the fundamental
precepts of the natural law as being gen-
erally valid but failing in paucioribus this,
at first sight, seems to deny a fundamental
tenet of the natural law thesis, viz., that it
sets up an unchanging standard. How can
we say that the precepts are sometimes
changed?
It may be of interest to nqte Suirez's
approach to the problem. He makes a dis-
tinction between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic"
change. In no part, does he give a complete
explanation of these terms, but the exam-
ples which he uses are illuminating. An
intrinsic change, he says, takes place when
a father ceases to occupy the status on
the event of his death; an extrinsic change
when a father ceases to occupy that status
on the death of his son.3 Using this model,
he goes on to show under what conditions
the natural law may be said to be changed.
There exists, he says, a vital relationship
between the precepts of the natural law
and the subject-matter to which they re-
s Id. at § 6.
late. A precept is usually framed in respect
to the existence of a number of circum-
stances which are quite common, and
easily recognized, and not of other circum-
stances.4 For example, the precept pro-
hibiting killing presupposes circumstances
involving the commission of an act leading
to the death of another, but does not ex-
tend to circumstances where an act is per-
formed in self-defense. 5
Sudrez is evidently thinking of the pre-
cepts in a way which endows them with
a certain openness," although this open-
ness is confined within certain limits, for
he says:
Since in its own set terms the natural law
has been written not upon tablets nor upon
parchments but in the minds of men it is
not always formulated in the mind accord-
ing to those general or indefinite terms in
which we quote it when speaking. For ex-
ample the law concerning the return of a
deposit, in so far as it is natural, is mentally
conceived, not in such simple and absolute
terms, but with limitations and circumspec-
tion, for reason dictates that a deposit
should be returned to one who seeks it
rightfully and reasonably, or in cases involv-
ing no objection based upon just defence,
whether of the State, of oneself, or of an
innocent person. Yet this law is quoted
simply in the following terms: A deposit
must be returned; because the rest is im-
plied, nor is it possible to make in the shape
of a law humanly drawn up a complete
statement of all the points involved. 7
It is in this way that Sudrez explains
Aquinas' statement that the precepts of the
4 Ibid.
5 Id. at § 5.
6 The same phenomenon is found in positive law.
See Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and
Rights, ESSAYS IN LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 145
(Flew ed. 1951).
7 DE LEGiHus bk. 2, ch. 13 § 5.
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natural law may change. A precept can-
not change intrinsically, e.g., the principle
proscribing theft is never abolished, but
it may change extrinsically, in so far as it
is framed in respect of the existence of
certain features and not of others.
Understood in this way, the precepts of
the natural law are associated with a cer-
tain degree of flexibility. The Schoolmen
speak of the precepts as being inapplicable
in paucioribus. Usually, the conditions to
which they relate are of a salient kind
(theft: taking the property of another;
adultery: having intercourse with another's
wife) but in certain cases the precepts
may be inapplicable (e.g., is it theft to take
the property of another in a case of neces-
sity or with some other adequate justifi-
cation?).
The question remains, however, as to
the way in which we determine whether
a precept will be applicable or not. Sudrez
suggests that it can only be the result of
interpretation applied to the various con-
ditions which arise from time to time.8 He
lists the common examples of killing, and
the taking of property which belongs to
another, and says that the former does not
cover acts of self-defense, the latter taking
in cases of necessity. The criteria which
he puts forward for determining whether
or not the precepts apply to the exceptional
8 Id. at ch. 16 § 6. He distinguishes interpretation
from equity, and states that equity is not applic-
able to the natural law as such, because equity is
in effect an emendation of the will of the legis-
lator, and the Will of God cannot be emended.
See DE LEGiBUs bk. 2, ch. 16 §§ 7, 9, 10. But it
may be applicable to positive law which contains
natural law. This distinction is very much bound
up with his belief in natural law as preceptive
divine law. For the purposes of our analysis we
will assume that involved in interpretation is the
application of equity.
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circumstances are justice and charity.9 The
question to ask in the case of theft would
be: "Is it just, proper or in accordance
with charity to take in this type of case?"
However, he goes on to explain that the
category of theft does not cover cases of
taking in extreme necessity because such
a taking is:
not a matter having to do with what is abso-
lutely in another's possession since in such
type of cases all things are common
property, nor is it a case in which the owner
is reasonably unwilling to part with his
property.10
In this passage there is posed a two-
sided solution: the factual criteria of the
concept of theft are no longer present - on
the assumption that in such cases property
becomes common - and the moral turpi-
tude of the action is lacking. According to
his conception of a moral precept or cate-
gory, two elements are always present
which specify the quality of the action:
factual criteria and moral goodness or
turpitude. Theft, for example, pertains to
the acquisition of what belongs to another,
but this alone is insufficient to endow the
precept with moral significance. The tak-
ing must be a wrongful one. Not all takings
are wrongful, for some are excused on the
basis of the presence of other criteria. And
the same is true of the killing, as shown
in the murder example previously men-
tioned.
On the other hand, can we say that the
category of theft does not apply to a case
of taking in extreme necessity, not only
because such a taking seems just, but also
because the factual criteria themselves are
9 DE LEGIBUS bk. 2, ch. 16 § 7.
1ld. at § 11.
changed in the light of the moral evalua-
tion of the circumstances? At first sight,
the answer seems clear. The factual cri-
teria have not changed, that is to say, there
is still acquisition of property from another
person. It seems to be a mere fiction to say
that in this situation the property becomes
common.
It is necessary for us to re-examine the
phrases "factual criteria" and "moral good-
ness." Certainly they were closely related
in the Schoolmen's minds. In my opinion
while they may be logically distinguished
in examining the structure of the moral
precept, they are fused in so far that the
moral precept is the subject-matter of an
individual's moral judgment. In the mind
of a particular individual such a judgment
would be framed in this way: "Taking the
property of another is wrong where A, B,
and C circumstances are present but not
where D circumstance is present." Where
in fact D circumstance is present, the tak-
ing is held to be justified, not as the
Schoolmen's language indicates, because
property becomes common in cases of ex-
treme need, but because another principle
has to be taken into account. We can only
retain the Schoolmen's language in this
context if, as is likely, they meant that in
so far as a moral evaluation (as distinct
from a factual determination) was con-
cerned, property had become common.
Neither Aquinas nor Sudrez in this con-
text give us any criteria for determining
whether an exception is permitted beyond
saying that, if it is right and proper in the
circumstances, then the exception is justi-
fied. It seems that what they have in mind
is the "conflict-of-duties" situation. More
than one precept may be applicable to the
situation in question. It is true that one
must not steal, but one must live, and situ-
ations will arise when not only the prin-
ciple proscribing theft, but also the
principle which protects human life must
be considered. If, as in the necessity exam-
ple, the latter principle is applied, what
we are doing is working -out in detail a
reconciliation between the different pre-
cepts in cases where the features may be
subsumed under one or other principle,
and we are also emphasizing the higher
value. In doing this, we do not jettison the
principle proscribing theft; we retain it. At
this stage, a further decision has to be
made, viz., which of the principles is to be
esteemed as the more important?"
It would have been more enlightening if
Sudrez had approached the problem from
this angle. His emphasis on interpretation
should have led him to consider the con-
flict-of-duties situation, but he was averted
from this, preferring rather to employ a
fiction to explain the inapplicability of pre-
cepts in the exceptional cases. However,
his discussion has at least shown that the
difficulty in asserting that natural law con-
stitutes an unchanging standard can be
obviated, if it is realized what the School-
men meant when they used the word
"change" to explain the phenomenon which
has been discussed in these pages. Indeed,
it might, be better to desist from using the
word "change" in order to explain the phe-
nomenon. Instead, we might say that the
precepts of the natural law do not conclu-
sively determine the cases to which they
apply but are prima facie precepts, the
ranking of which, in the event of conflict,
lies in the evaluational hierarchy of the
rules themselves.
At the beginning of this article, the two
11 Cf., L. G. Miller, Rules and Exceptions, vol.
66, ETHICS 262 (1956).
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ways in which the Schoolmen believed that
natural law could change were set out. It
will be recalled that Aquinas spoke of use-
ful things being added to the natural law
by positive law, and we had a few words
to say on this question. 12
In actual fact, Aquinas experiences
much difficulty in accommodating this
concept of utility to the previously out-
lined features of the natural law. Indeed,
his whole discussion revolves around a
perennial question which is associated with-
the concept of the ius gentium, and more
particularly with the institutions of private
property and slavery. If nature endows
man with full dominion over his liberty
and the fruits of the earth, how can one
explain the existence of institutions (seem-
ingly of a permanent nature) which inter-
fere with this blissful state? Not only that,
but are there not also customs of-positive
law (such as prescription) which circum-
scribe the status naturae?
The Augustinian school, which found
favour with Duns Scotus and William of
Occam, had propounded a theory which
seemed to take away the very foundation
of the natural law as a continuing body of
rules. This School inclined to the view that
human nature could be considered both
in its status innocentiae and in its fallen
state: the lex naturalis endured in the
former state, the ius gentium in the latter.
Such an interpretation, of course, presents
a definite picture of mankind: once upon
a time a perfect idyllic state existed where
freedom abounded, where there was no
coercion and where man would share the
12 Id. at 1-2.
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fruits of the earth. Such a state had been
radically affected through man turning to
evil.. Bound now by positive institutions,
his liberty is often denied him and the
fruits of the earth have been-divided.'8
Aquinas approaches the question in a
different manner. He distinguishes between
a preceptive form of natural law-and a
permissive form. Natural law prescribes
that one must perform or abstain from per-
forming certain actions, but it also permits
or recognizes as valid certain other things
which benefit mankind.' 4 Sudrez mentions
a third category: where the natural law
merely favours a certain state of affairs.'"
The question remains: what is the re-
lationship between the ius gentium and
natural law? If natural law permits com-
mon ownership, while the institution of
private property has been introduced by
the ius gentium, can it be said that the
natural law is changed or is in conflict with
the ius gentium? The answer to this ques-
tion depends on the status which one
attributes to the ius gentium.
Aquinas' treatment of the ius gentium
is not at all satisfactory. He wavers be-
tween the opinion which regards the ius
gentium as those precepts which are com-
mon to man alone, and the opinion which
associates the ius gentium with the natural
law as a collection of remote conclusions
dependent on an existing status quo.16 In
article 4 of Q. 95, Pt. I-I, he compares
13 VILLEY, LagoNs D'HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSO-
PHIE DE DROrr 142-43 (1957).
14 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-11, q. 94, art. 5, ad 3.
15 DE LEGIEUS bk. 2, ch. 14 § 6. He speaks of a
state of affairs which has its foundation in a con-
ditione naturali, for example, that a son should
inherit from a father who dies intestate, and the
practice of giving credence to two witnesses.
16 SENN, DE LA JUSTICE ET DU DRorr 58 (1927).
the various ways in which positive law is
derived from the law and distinguishes the
ius gentium (conclusio) from the ius civile
(determinatio):
to the law of nations belongs those things
which are derived from the law of nature,
as conclusions from premises, such as just
buyings and sellings, and the like, without
which men cannot live together and these
are part of the law of nature, since man is
a social animal. But those things which are
derived from the law of nature by way of
particular determination, belong to the civil
law, according as each state decides what
is best for itself.
However, in another place he switches to
Ulpian's definition, according to which the
ius gentium is equated with that part of
the natural law which is common to man
only, although at the same time he asserts
that the ius gentium is grounded on some
type of utility.' 7 In these two articles at
least three meanings are given to the con-
cept: 1) that it is the social part of the
natural law, 2) that it is the natural law
in so far as that is common to man alone,
3) that it consists of rules based on utility.
To the reader, it may seem as if there
are a number of distinctions which do not
give any precise standard by which he may
judge the ius gentium. Let us try to see
why Aquinas emphasizes the features men-
tioned above. In the first place, it seems,
he was drawing attention to the develop-
ment of social institutions which enabled
men to live harmoniously together. At the
same time he was troubled by the "natural-
istic" view (which was closely associated
with a picture of an original state of inno-
cence) according to which a body, not so
much of rules, but of rights, existed at
17 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, U-11, q. 57, art. 3.
230
some time or other, but had given way to
the harsh realities of social intercourse and
even conflict when there was a need for
the reconciliation and limitation of these
rights. Finally in attributing to the ius
gentium the status of rather remote con-
clusions he was drawing attention to the
simplicity of the original status naturae as
compared with the complicated system of
rules to which social intercourse had given
rise.
It is only when we turn to the discus-
sion of the ius gentium in the De Legibus
of Sudrez that we find a sustained attempt
to get rid of these ambiguities and to give
an autonomous status to the ius gentium.
Sudrez blatantly refuses to accept the no-
tion, implicit in certain parts of Aquinas'
discussion, of a dualistic natural law. We
cannot, he says, conceive of man outside
of social intercourse. Laws and rules,
rights and duties, are therefore necessary
to enable him to live in peace and justice
with his neighbour.' 8 There was no need
to set up a secondary natural law to deal
with the "social" question and conse-
quently no need to consider the ius gen-
tium to be the result of a complicated
deductive process. What was important
was to consider man and society as they
presented themselves to the observer.' 0
In saying this, Sudrez hit upon two very
important features. He was aware that
society had the capacity to develop and
had developed, and he recognized the im-
portance of various institutions based on
Is See DE LEGIBUS, bk. 2, ch. 17 § 9.
19 Ibid. For a discussion of Sudrez's treatment of
ius gentiumn see BARCLA TRELLES, LES THEOLO-
GIENS ESPAGNOLS DU XVI SIECLE ET L'ECOLE MOD-
ERN DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL. ACADIIMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS, VOL. 1, p.
441-71 (1933).
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a certain utility which facilitated the inter-
course of the members of any society. Such
institutions, however, did not have an ab-
solute character; their status and existence
was the outcome of social recognition
rather than of the demands of nature. 20
Once established, they did have a certain
degree of continuity. They were distin-
guished from what was the subject-matter
of civil law on the ground that they were
not instituted by one nation but by most
nations by mutual imitation. 21
Among the examples which Sudirez gives
to demonstarte the existence of the ius
gentium are institutions which pertain to
the law of the state (such as prescription)
and institutions which pertain to inter-
course between nations, the ius inter gentes
(such as the right to wage a just war). 22
Aquinas had paid attention only to the
former type and had no conception of a
ius inter gentes because he was thinking
in terms of the Holy Roman Empire. By
the seventeenth century the Empire was no
longer the universal institution it had been.
The era of the national state had arrived.
Sudirez is one of the first to recognize this
second type of ius gentium and even to
attribute to it a closer relationship with
natural law than the former type.
Communities have need of some system of
law whereby they may be directed and
properly ordered with regard to this kind
of intercourse and association .... For just
as in one state or province law is introduced
by custom, so among the human race as a
whole it was possible for laws to be intro-
duced by the habitual conduct of nations.
This was more feasible because the matters
20 DE LEGIBUs bk. 2, ch. 19 §2.
21 Id. at § 6.
22 Id. at § 8.
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found within the law in question are few,
very closely related to natural law and most
easily deduced therefrom in a manner so
advantageous and so in harmony with
nature itself that while this derivation may
not be self-evident, that is, not essentially
and absolutely required for moral rectitude,
it is nevertheless quite in accord with nature,
and universally acceptable for its own
sake.23
On the other hand, the first type of ius
gentium embodied precepts which did not
have for their immediate end the harmoni-
ous fellowship of nations but were directed
to the internal organization of state. Never-
theless, says Sudrez:
they are of such a nature that, in the posses-
sion of similar usages or laws, almost all
nations agree with one another; or at least
they resemble one another, at times in a
general manner, and at times specifically, so
to speak. 24
It is clear that this type of ius gentium
is in no way founded upon something
which has always existed. It is the product
of historical development and must be
seen in this light. And yet Sudrez asserts
that, once these customs are established,
natural law would seem to incline to their
recognition as benefiting the existing state
of mankind. But this does not imply any
permanence, for circumstances might
change and a new rule develop. Nor does
this imply moral rectitude in the precepts
of the ius gentium.25 The one qualification
23 Id. at § 9. BARciA TRELLES, op. cit. supra note
19, at 462-69.
24 DE LEGIBUS bk. 2, ch. 19 § 10. Contract, for
example, in its general aspect, is an institution
which is found in the legal systems of most na-
tions, but it differs in so far as its form or detail
is concerned within these nations.
25 DE LEGIBUS bk. 2, ch. 20 § 7. Sudtrez mentions
as an example of a common custom the tolera-
tion of prostitutes. Ibid.
is that the ius inter gentes is more perma-
nent in that it requires the consent of nearly
all nations before it can be changed. 26
Sudrez's approach would seem to obviate-
the problem which disturbed the minds of
earlier writers, namely, the growth and de-
velopment of society. By rejecting the dis-
tinction between a primary and a secondary
natural law, an individual and a social na-
tural law, a natural law based on inclina-
tion and a natural law based on intricate
deduction, he has paved the way for an
approach to the natural law and the ius
gentium which preserves their autonomous
characteristics. Based on custom and util-
ity, the ius gentium has no longer an abso-
lute character; it is the product of historical
development, even though it is true to say
that looked at from the point of view of its
usefulness to a present state of society it
is approved by the natural law.
There remains one further issue to dis-
cuss. Sudrez does speak of natural law as
being changed by the ius gentium in so far
as the ius gentium introduces a change in
the subject matter of the natural law.2 7
The context of this assertion is his dis-
cussion of common ownership and liberty.
Aquinas had offered the opinion that
slavery (and private property) was a benef-
icent institution which had a semi-perma-
nent status. In one article, for example, he
had said:
Considered absolutely, the fact that this
particular man should be a slave rather than
another man, is based, not on natural rea-
26 Id. at §8. The institution of the just war may
give way to a compulsory system of arbitration.
See BARcIA TRELLES, op. cit. supra note 19, at
470-71.
27 DE LEGIBus bk. 2, ch. 14 § 12.
son, but on some resultant utility, -in that
it is useful to this man to be ruled by a wiser
man, and the latter to be helped by the
former. . . . Wherefore, slavery, which
belongs to the right of nations, is natural
in the second way, but not in the first. 28
Sudrez, of course, draws the line between
what is useful and what is natural. Accord-
ingly, it might have been expected that he
would explain slavery on the ground that
it was merely a useful custom which need
not necessarily be justified by recourse to
reason which Aquinas attributes to it.
However, he seems to approach the prob-
lem in a different way.
It will be recalled that he mentioned a
permissive or concessive form of the nat-
ural law. Common ownership and liberty
he says, must be understood as part of
the natural law in this way.
With respect to these things, the natural
law lays down. no precept enjoining that
they should remain in this state, rather does
it leave the matter to the management of
men, such management to accord with the
demands of reason.
It is thus permissible, he says, for men to
introduce rules and institutions of their
own making to regulate the exercise of
those things which natural law permits. 29
It seems to us that Sudrez is here making
a distinction between natural law and na-
tural rights.30 Indeed in the very opening
of his discussion of the ius gentium he
makes a distinction between ius utile and
ius legale. The former he points out has
to do with a faculty or right of doing some-
28 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, lI-I, q. 57, art. 3, ad 2.
29 DE LEGIBus bk. 2, ch. 14 § 6.
30 See Rommen, The Natural Law in the Renais-
sance Period, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 460, 483-89
(1948-49). GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE
MIDDLE AGES. 81-82 (1938).
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thing.31 It is not until he faces the liberty
and common ownership questions that he
reverts to this distinction. The natural law
of dominion, he says, has conferred on
man the power over his liberty, but in so
far as man thereby has a claim to the en-
joyment of something, nothing is said of
the conditions under which the right may
be exercised. 32 The natural law of domin-
ion is different from preceptive natural law,
continues Sudrez, in that "it consists of a
certain fact, that is, a certain condition or
habitual relation of things. '3 3 Such a con-
dition might change, as distinct from the
precepts of the nature which may never
change. Natural law protected common
ownership while property was held in com-
mon. When property was divided the ius
naturale utile was to that extent modified. 34
As far as slavery was concerned, this was
not even an institution of the ius gentium:
it was merely a part of positive penal law.
Consequently, liberty was still positively
part of the natural law. 35
The fundamental position is that the ius
gentium may detract from the plenitude
resident in natural rights. Perhaps we could
say that Sudrez was on the brink of recog-
nizing the whole question of natural rights
and their dependence on an ordered sys-
tem of relationships (e.g., restriction of
liberty of one in the interest of all). This
31 DE LEGIBUS bk. 2, ch. 17 §2. "Jus enim interdum
significat moralem facultatem ad rem aliquam,
vel in re, sive sit verum domenum, sive aliqua
participatia ejus, quod est proprium objectum
justitiae." Ibid.
32 Sufirez uses the word ius here interchangeably
with facultas and actio.
33 DE LEGIBUS bk. 2, ch. 14 §§16, 17, 18.
34 The right of private property came into ex-
istence.
35 DE LEGIBUs bk. 2, ch. 18 §9. It is clear that
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would lead to the question of natural
rights and positive rights.
However, he speaks of natural rights
only in the context of liberty and prop-
erty.36 Could it not be said that natural
rights are also existent as far as the other
precepts of the natural law are concerned?
If natural law forbids murder, ought not
we to recognize a right to life? In one part
of his work, Sudrez admits that prescrip-
tion and concession are related. But he does
not carry this thought to completion. If
indeed we assert that other precepts of the
36 However Suirez hints at "right to life." "Nam
etiam natura dedit homini vitam quoad ejus ac
possessionem." DE LEGIBus bk. 2, ch. 14 §18.
Sudrez is adverse to attributing to slavery the
status of a universal custom.
PUNISHMENT IN A
FREE SOCIETY
(Continued)
aid, withdrawal of recognition, or other dip-
lomatic action in the name of humanitarian
intercession. On October 14, 1946, the
Holy See, finding the Archbishop "arbi-
trarily arrested and unjustly sentenced,"
excommunicated "all those who have con-
tributed physically or morally toward the
consummation" of this crime. 48
48 N. Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1946, p. 1. col. 2.
natural law are connected with rights, it
would seem that such rights also would be
subject to limitation.
It seems that even if we do admit the full
category of natural rights, the problem of
"change" or of circumscription can be
tackled in the same way as we tackled pre-
ceptive natural law- on the collision of
duties pattern. In many cases there will be
no question of the non-recognition of these
rights. The right to life invariably subsists.
In a few cases one or other of these rights
may not be applicable in the circumstances.
The felon is deprived of his liberty, because
the community has the right to be pro-
tected from his actions. In such cases, a
decision has to be made as to which right
is to be accorded superiority. It is precisely
this decision which the ius gentium and,
ultimately, positive law makes.
In a free society, the interests of pre-
venting crime and protecting fundamental
rights are entirely compatible. A criminal
who remains at large in the community
arouses alarm proportionate to the out-
rageousness of his crimes. An unfair crimi-
nal trial can arouse no less alarm. Such a
proceeding threatens the liberty of every
potential defendant, a class that embraces
the entire community. The criminal trial
in a free society must continue to convict
the guilty and acquit the innocent, but it
must do so within a framework of fairness
to the accused.
